Leila Gharsellaoui and Anis Jarboui
This paper emphasizes the importance of the cross-effect of investment in R and D activities, the independence of the board of directors and the presence of institutional investors on the quality of accounting information and more specifically on the quality of discretionary accruals in a broadly diversified context. To empirically verify this subject, we carry out an empirical investigation for a sample composed of 98 French companies listed on the SBF during the period 2009-2015. First, this analysis provides empirical results of the impact of board independence, institutional shareholders and R and D investment on the quality of discretionary accruals for the full sample. We prove that the intensity of R and D investment has a positive and significant effect on earnings management according to both models. In addition, the empirical results also show that according to the two models the independence of the board of directors has a negative and statically significant effect on the quality of the accruals whereas according to the model of Shahrur, et al., the effect negative impact of institutional investors on the quality of accruals is statistically insignificant. Second, in this article we examine the cross effect of governance variables and the intensity of investment in R and D activities on the quality of discretionary accruals. This analysis suggests that the interaction of board independence and R and D investment on the quality of accruals has a negative and significant effect on earnings management determined by the model of Kothari but that it has no significant effect on earnings management according to the model of Shahrur, et al. As for the study of the impact of this association according to the model of Shahrur, et al. we find that the effect of this cross-relationship is statistically insignificant associated with the quality of discretionary accruals.
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